PrIC3: Property Directed Reachability for MDPs by Batz, Kevin et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
14
83
5v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  3
0 A
pr
 20
20
PrIC3: Property Directed Reachability for MDPs⋆
Kevin Batz1, Sebastian Junges2, Benjamin Lucien Kaminski3[0000−0001−5185−2324] ,
Joost-Pieter Katoen1, Christoph Matheja4, and Philipp Schröer1
1 RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
2 University of California, Berkeley, USA
3 University College London, United Kingdom
4 ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland
Abstract. IC3 has been a leap forward in symbolic model checking. This paper
proposes PrIC3 (pronounced pricy-three), a conservative extension of IC3 to
symbolic model checking of MDPs. Our main focus is to develop the theory
underlying PrIC3.Alongside, we present a first implementation of PrIC3 including
the key ingredients from IC3 such as generalization, repushing, and propagation.
1 Introduction
IC3. Also known as property-directed reachability (PDR) [22], IC3 [12] is a symbolic
approach for verifying finite transition systems (TSs) against safety properties like
“bad states are unreachable”. It combines bounded model checking (BMC) [11] and
inductive invariant generation. Put shortly, IC3 either proves that a set B of bad states
is unreachable by finding a set of non-B states closed under reachability—called an
inductive invariant—or refutes reachability of B by a counterexample path reaching B.
Rather than unrolling the transition relation (as in BMC), IC3 attempts to incrementally
strengthen the invariant “no state in B is reachable” into an inductive one. In addition, it
applies aggressive abstraction to the explored state space, so-called generalization [35].
These aspects together with the enormous advances in modern SAT solvers have led to
IC3’s success. IC3 has been extended [37,26] and adapted to software verification [18,43].
This paper develops a quantitative IC3 framework for probabilistic models.
MDPs. Markov decision processes (MDPs) extend TSs with discrete probabilistic
choices. They are central in planning, AI as well as in modeling randomized distributed
algorithms. A key question in verifyingMDPs is quantitative reachability: “is the (maxi-
mal) probability to reach Bat most λ?”. Quantitative reachability [5,6] reduces to solving
linear programs (LPs). Various tools support MDP model checking, e.g., Prism [42],
Storm [21], modest [33], and EPMC [30]. The LPs are mostly solved using (variants
of) value iteration [27,8,50,34]. Symbolic BDD-based MDP model checking originated
two decades ago [4] and is rather successful.
Towards IC3 for MDPs. Despite the success of BDD-based symbolic methods in tools
like Prism, IC3 has not penetrated probabilistic model checking yet. The success of IC3
⋆ This work has been supported by the ERC Advanced Grant 787914 (FRAPPANT), NSF grants
1545126 (VeHICaL) and 1646208, the DARPA Assured Autonomy program, Berkeley Deep
Drive, and by Toyota under the iCyPhy center.
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and the importance of quantitative reachability in probabilistic model checking raises
the question whether and how IC3 can be adapted—not just utilized—to reason about
quantitative reachability inMDPs. This paper addresses the challenges of answering this
question. It extends IC3 in several dimensions to overcome these hurdles,makingPrIC3—
to our knowledge—the first IC3 framework for quantitative reachability in MDPs5.
Notably, PrIC3 is conservative: For a threshold λ = 0, PrIC3 solves the same qualitative
problem and behaves (almost) the same as standard IC3. Our main contribution is
developing the theory underlying PrIC3, which is accompanied by a proof-of-concept
implementation.
Challenge 1 (Leaving the Boolean domain). IC3 iteratively computes frames, which
are over-approximations of sets of states that can reach B in a bounded number of
steps. For MDPs, Boolean reachability becomes a quantitative reachability probability.
This requires a shift: frames become real-valued functions rather than sets of states.
Thus, there are infinitely many possible frames—even for finite-state MDPs—just as
for infinite-state software [18,43] and hybrid systems [53]. Additionally, whereas in
TSs a state reachable within k steps remains reachable on increasing k, the reachability
probability in MDPs may increase. This complicates ensuring termination of an IC3
algorithm for MDPs. △
Challenge 2 (Counterexamples , single paths). For TSs, a single cycle-free path6 to B
suffices to refute that “B is not reachable”.This is not true in the probabilistic setting [31].
Instead, proving that the probability of reaching B exceeds the threshold λ requires a set
of possibly cyclic paths—e.g., represented as a sub-MDP [14]—whose probability mass
exceeds λ. Handling sets of paths as counterexamples in the context of IC3 is new. △
Challenge 3 (Strengthening). This key IC3 technique intuitively turns a proof obligation
of type (i) “state s is unreachable from the initial state sI ” into type (ii) “s’s predecessors
are unreachable from sI ”. A first issue is that in the quantitative setting, the standard
characterization of reachability probabilities in MDPs (the Bellman equations) inher-
ently reverses the direction of reasoning (cf. “reverse” IC3 [52]): Hence, strengthening
turns (i) “s cannot reach B” into (ii) “s’s successors cannot reach B”.
Amuchmore challenging issue, however, is that in the quantitative setting obligations
of type (i) read “s is reachable with at most probability δ”. However, the strengthened
type (ii) obligation must then read: “the weighted sum over the reachability probabilities
of the successors of s is atmost δ”. In general, there are infinitelymanypossible choices of
subobligations for the successors of s in order to satisfy the original obligation, because—
grossly simplified—there are infinitely many possibilities for a and b to satisfy weighted
sums such as 13a +
2
3 b ≤ δ. While we only need one choice of subobligations, picking
a good one is approximately as hard as solving the entire problem altogether. We hence
require a heuristic, which is guided by a user-provided oracle. △
Challenge 4 (Generalization). “One of the key components of IC3 is [inductive] gener-
alization” [12]. Generalization [35] abstracts single states. It makes IC3 scale, but is not
5 Recently, (standard) IC3 for TSswas utilized inmodel checkingMarkov chains [48] to on-the-fly
compute the states that cannot reach B.
6 In [37], tree-like counterexamples are used for non-linear predicate transformers in IC3.
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essential for correctness. To facilitate generalization, systems should be encoded symbol-
ically, i.e., integer-valued program variables describe states. Frames thus map variables
to probabilities. A first aspect is how to effectively present them to an SMT-solver. Con-
ceptually, we use uninterpreted functions and universal quantifiers (encoding program
behavior) together with linear real arithmetic to encode the weighted sums occurring
when reasoning about probabilities. A second aspect is more fundamental: Abstractly,
IC3’s generalization guesses an unreachable set of states. We, however, need to guess
this set and a probability for each state. To be effective, these guesses should moreover
eventually yield an inductive frame, which is often highly nonlinear. We propose three
SMT-guided interpolation variants for guessing these maps. △
Structure of this paper.We developPrIC3 gradually:We explain the underlying rationale
in Sect. 3.We also describe the core of PrIC3—calledPrIC3H—which resembles closely
themain loop of standard IC3, but uses adapted frames and termination criteria (Chall. 1).
In linewithChall. 3,PrIC3H is parameterized by a heuristicHwhich is appliedwhenever
we need to select one out of infinitely many probabilities. No requirements on the quality
ofH are imposed. PrIC3H is sound and always terminates: If it returns true, then the
maximal reachability probability is bounded by λ. Without additional assumptions
aboutH , PrIC3H is incomplete: on returning false, it is unknownwhether the returned
subMDP is indeed a counterexample (Chall. 2). Sect. 4 details strengthening (Chall. 3).
Sect. 5 presents a sound and complete algorithmPrIC3 on top ofPrIC3H . Sect. 6 presents
a prototype, discusses our chosen heuristics, and addresses Chall. 4. Sect. 7 shows some
encouraging experiments, but also illustrates need for further progress.
RelatedWork. Just like IC3 has been a symbiosis of different approaches,PrIC3has been
inspired by several existing techniques from the verification of probabilistic systems.
BMC. Adaptions of BMC to Markov chains (MCs) with a dedicated treatment of cycles
have been pursued in [56]. The encoding in [23] annotates sub-formulae with proba-
bilities. The integrated SAT solving process implicitly unrolls all paths leading to an
exponential blow-up. In [51], this is circumvented by grouping paths, discretizing them,
and using an encoding with quantifiers and bit-vectors, but without numerical values.
Recently, [55] extends this idea to a PAC algorithm by purely propositional encodings
and (approximate) model counting [16]. These approaches focus on MCs and are not
mature yet.
Invariant synthesis. Quantitative loop invariants are key in analyzing probabilistic pro-
grams whose operational semantics are (possibly infinite) MDPs [25]. A quantitative
invariant I maps states to probabilities. I is shown to be an invariant by comparing I to
the result of applying theMDP’sBellman operator to I . Existing approaches for invariant
synthesis are, e.g., based on weakest pre-expectations [41,45,39,38,32], template-based
constraint solving [24], notions of martingales [15,9,3,54], and solving recurrence rela-
tions [10]. All but the last technique require user guidance.
Abstraction. To combat state-space explosion, abstraction is often employed. CEGAR
forMDPs [36] deals with explicit sets of paths as counterexamples.Game-based abstrac-
tion [40,29] and partial exploration [13] exploit that not all paths have to be explored
to prove bounds on reachability probabilities. Whereas game-based abstraction merges
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states to abstract away from the precise behavior along a path, partial exploration cuts
paths and assumes that the suffix of this paths does (not) lead to B.
Statisticalmethods and (deep) reinforcement learning.Finally, an avenue that avoids stor-
ing a (complete) model are simulation-based approaches (statistical model checking [2])
and variants of reinforcement learning, possibly with neural networks. For MDPs, these
approaches yield weak statistical guarantees [19], but may provide good oracles.
2 Problem Statement
Our aim is to prove that themaximal probability of reaching a set B of bad states from the
initial state sI of a Markov decision processM is at most some threshold λ. Below, we
give a formal description of our problem. We refer to [49,7] for a thorough introduction.
Definition 1 (MDPs). AMarkov decision process (MDP) is a tupleM = (S, sI, Act, P),
where S is a finite set of states, sI ∈ S is the initial state, Act is a finite set of actions,
and P : S×Act× S → [0, 1] is a transition probability function. For state s, letAct (s) =
{a ∈ Act | ∃s′ ∈ S : P(s, a, s′) > 0} be the enabled actions at s. For all states s ∈ S, we
require |Act (s) | ≥ 1 and
∑
s′∈S P(s, a, s
′) = 1. △
For the remainder of this paper,wefix anMDPM = (S, sI, Act, P), a set ofbad states B ⊆ S,
and a threshold λ ∈ [0, 1]. The maximal7 (unbounded) reachability probability to even-
tually reach a state in B from a state s is denoted by Prmax (s |= ♦B). We characterize
Prmax (s |= ♦B) using the so-called Bellman operator. Let MN denote the set of func-
tions from N to M. Anticipating IC3 terminology,we call a function F ∈ [0, 1]S a frame.
We denote by F[s] the evaluation of frame F for state s.
Definition 2 (Bellman Operator). For a set of actions A ⊆ Act, we define the Bellman
operator for A as a frame transformer ΦA : [0, 1]S → [0, 1]S with
ΦA (F) [s] =

1, if s ∈ B
max
a∈A
∑
s′∈S
P(s, a, s′) · F[s′] , if s < B .
We write Φa for Φ{a}, Φ for ΦAct, and call Φ simply the Bellman operator. △
For every state s, the maximal reachability probability Prmax (s |= ♦B) is then given by
the least fixed point of the Bellman operator Φ. That is,
∀ s : Prmax (s |= ♦B) =
(
lfp Φ
)
[s] ,
where the underlying partial order on frames is a complete lattice with ordering
F1 ≤ F2 iff ∀ s ∈ S : F1[s] ≤ F2[s] .
In terms of the Bellman operator, our formal problem statement reads as follows:
7 Maximal with respect to all possible resolutions of nondeterminism in the MDP.
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Fig. 1. The MDPM serving as a running example.
Given an MDPM with initial state sI , a set B of bad states, and a threshold λ ∈ [0, 1],
prove or refute that Prmax (sI |= ♦B) =
(
lfp Φ
)
[sI ] ≤ λ .
Whenever Prmax (sI |= ♦B) ≤ λ indeed holds, we say that the MDP M is safe (with
respect to the set of bad states B and threshold λ); otherwise, we call it unsafe.
Recovery Statement 1. For λ = 0, our problem statement is equivalent to the qualita-
tive reachability problem solved by (reverse) standard IC3, i.e, prove or refute that all
bad states in B are unreachable from the initial state sI .
Example 1. The MDPM in Fig. 1 consists of 6 states with initial state s0 and bad states
B = {s5}. In s2, actions a and b are enabled; in all other states, one unlabeled action is
enabled. We have Prmax (s0 |= ♦B) = 2/3. Hence,M is safe for all thresholds λ ≥ 2/3 and
unsafe for λ < 2/3. In particular,M is unsafe for λ = 0 as s5 is reachable from s0. △
3 The Core PrIC3 Algorithm
The purpose of PrIC3 is to prove or refute that the maximal probability to reach a
bad state in B from the initial state sI of the MDP M is at most λ. In this section, we
explain the rationale underlyingPrIC3. Moreover, we describe the core of PrIC3—called
PrIC3H—which bears close resemblance to the main loop of standard IC3 for TSs.
Because of the inherent direction of the Bellman operator, we build PrIC3 on reverse
IC3 [52], cf. Chall. 3. Reversing constitutes a shift from reasoning along the direction
initial-to-bad to bad-to-initial.While this shift is mostly inessential to the fundamentals
underlying IC3, the reverse direction is unswayable in the probabilistic setting.Whenever
we draw a connection to standard IC3, we thus generally mean reverse IC3.
3.1 Inductive Frames
IC3 for TSs operates on (qualitative) frames representing sets of states of the TS at hand.
A frame F can hence be thought of as a mapping8 from states to {0, 1}. In PrIC3 for
MDPs, we need to move from a Boolean to a quantitative regime. Hence, a (quantitative)
frame is a mapping from states to probabilities in [0, 1].
8 In IC3, frames are typically characterized by logical formulae. To understand IC3’s fundamental
principle, however, we prefer to think of frames as functions in {0, 1}S partially ordered by ≤.
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For a given TS, consider the frame transformerT that adds to a given input frame F ′
all bad states in B and all predecessors of the states contained in F ′. The rationale of
standard (reverse) IC3 is to find a frame F ∈ {0, 1}S such that (i) the initial state sI does
not belong to F and (ii) applying T takes us down in the partial order on frames, i.e.,
(i) F[sI ] = 0 and (ii) T (F) ≤ F .
Intuitively, (i) postulates the hypothesis that sI cannot reach B and (ii) expresses that F
is closed under adding bad states and taking predecessors, thus affirming the hypothesis.
Analogously, the rationale of PrIC3 is to find a frame F ∈ [0, 1]S such that (i) F pos-
tulates that the probability of sI to reach B is at most the threshold λ and (ii) applying
the Bellman operator Φ to F takes us down in the partial order on frames, i.e.,
(i) F[sI ] ≤ λ and (ii) Φ(F) ≤ F .
Frames satisfying the above conditions are called inductive invariants in IC3. We adopt
this terminology. By Park’s Lemma [47], which in our setting reads
Φ(F) ≤ F implies lfp Φ ≤ F ,
an inductive invariant F would indeed witness that Prmax (sI |= ♦B) ≤ λ, because
Prmax (sI |= ♦B) =
(
lfp Φ
)
[sI ] ≤ F[sI ] ≤ λ .
If no inductive invariant exists, then standard IC3 will find a counterexample: a path
from the initial state sI to a bad state in B, which serves as a witness to refute. Analo-
gously, PrIC3 will find a counterexample, but of a different kind: Since single paths are
insufficient as counterexamples in the probabilistic realm (Chall. 2), PrIC3 will instead
find a subsystem of states of the MDP witnessing Prmax (sI |= ♦B) > λ.
3.2 The PrIC3 Invariants
Analogously to standard IC3, PrIC3 aims to find the inductive invariant by maintaining
a sequence of frames F0 ≤ F1 ≤ F2 ≤ . . . such that Fi[s] overapproximates the maximal
probability of reaching B from s within at most i steps. This i-step-bounded reachability
probability Prmax
(
s |= ♦≤iB
)
can be characterized using the Bellman operator:Φ (0) is
the 0-step probability; it is 1 for every s ∈ B and 0 otherwise. For any i ≥ 0, we have
Prmax
(
s |= ♦≤iB
)
=
(
Φ
i
(
Φ (0)
))
[s] =
(
Φ
i+1 (0)
)
[s] ,
where 0, the frame that maps every state to 0, is the least frame of the underlying
complete lattice. For a finite MDP, the unbounded reachability probability is then given
by the limit
Prmax (s |= ♦B) =
(
lfp Φ
)
[s]
(∗)
=
(
lim
n→∞
Φ
n (0)
)
[s] = lim
n→∞
Prmax
(
s |= ♦≤nB
)
,
where (∗) is a consequence of the well-known Kleene fixed point theorem [44].
The sequence F0 ≤ F1 ≤ F2 ≤ . . . maintained by PrIC3 should frame-wise overap-
proximate the increasing sequence Φ (0) ≤ Φ2 (0) ≤ Φ3 (0) . . .. Pictorially:
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F0 ≤ F1 ≤ F2 ≤ . . . ≤ Fk
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
0 ≤ Φ (0) ≤ Φ2 (0) ≤ Φ3 (0) ≤ . . . ≤ Φk+1 (0)
However, the sequenceΦ (0) , Φ2 (0) , Φ3 (0) , . . .will never explicitly be known toPrIC3.
Instead, PrIC3 will ensure the above frame-wise overapproximation property implicitly
by enforcing the so-called PrIC3 invariants on the frame sequence F0, F1, F2, . . .. Apart
from allowing for a threshold 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 on the maximal reachability probability, these
invariants coincide with the standard IC3 invariants (where λ = 0 is fixed). Formally:
Definition 3 (PrIC3 Invariants). Frames F0, . . . , Fk , for k ≥ 0, satisfy the PrIC3 in-
variants, a fact we will denote by PrIC3Inv (F0, . . . , Fk), if all of the following hold:
1. Initiality: F0 = Φ (0)
2. Chain Property: ∀ 0 ≤ i < k : Fi ≤ Fi+1
3. Frame-safety: ∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ k : Fi[sI ] ≤ λ
4. Relative Inductivity: ∀ 0 ≤ i < k : Φ (Fi) ≤ Fi+1 △
The PrIC3 invariants indeed enforce the above picture: The chain property ensures
F0 ≤ F1 ≤ . . . ≤ Fk . To understand that F0, . . . , Fk frame-wise overapproximates
Φ (0) , Φ2 (0) , . . . , Φk+1 (0), we proceed by induction on k: We have Φ (0) = F0 ≤ F0
by initiality. Assuming Φi+1 (0) ≤ Fi as the induction hypothesis, monotonicity of Φ
implies Φi+2 (0) ≤ Φ(Fi) ≤ Fi+1, the latter by relative inductivity.
By overapproximatingΦ (0) , Φ2 (0) , . . . , Φk+1 (0), the frames F0, . . . , Fk in effect
bound the maximal step-bounded reachability probability of every state:
Lemma 1. Let frames F0, . . . , Fk satisfy the PrIC3 invariants. Then
∀ s ∀ i ≤ k : Prmax
(
s |= ♦≤iB
)
≤ Fi[s].
In particular, Lem. 1 together with frame-safety ensures that the maximal step-bounded
reachability probability of the initial state sI to reach B is at most the threshold λ.
As for proving that the unbounded reachability probability is also at most λ, it
suffices to find two consecutive frames, say Fi and Fi+1, that coincide:
Lemma 2. Let frames F0, . . . , Fk satisfy the PrIC3 invariants. Then
∃ i < k : Fi = Fi+1 implies Pr
max (sI |= ♦B) ≤ λ .
Proof. Fi = Fi+1 and relative inductivity yieldΦ(Fi) ≤ Fi+1 = Fi , rendering Fi inductive.
By Park’s lemma (cf. Section 3.1), we obtain lfp Φ ≤ Fi and—by frame-safety—
conclude
Prmax (sI |= ♦B) =
(
lfp Φ
)
[sI ] ≤ Fi[sI ] ≤ λ . ⊓⊔
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Data:MDPM, set of bad states B, threshold λ
Result: true or false and a subset of the states ofM
1 F0 ← 0; F1 ← 1; k ← 1; oldSubsystem ← ∅;
2 while true do
3 success, F0, . . . , Fk, subsystem ← StrengthenH (F0, . . . , Fk );
4 if ¬success then return false, subsystem;
5 Fk+1 ← 1;
6 F0, . . . , Fk+1 ← Propagate (F0, . . . , Fk+1);
7 if ∃ 1 ≤ i ≤ k : Fi = Fi+1 then return true, ;
8 if oldSubsystem = subsystem then return false, subsystem;
9 k ← k + 1; oldSubsystem ← subsystem;
10 end
Algorithm 1: PrIC3H (M, B, λ)
3.3 Operationalizing the PrIC3 Invariants for Proving Safety
Lem. 2gives us a clear angle of attack for proving anMDP safe: Repeatedly add and refine
frames approximating step-bounded reachability probabilities for more and more steps
while enforcing the PrIC3 invariants (cf. Def. 3.2) until two consecutive frames coincide.
Analogously to standard IC3, this approach is taken by the core loopPrIC3H depicted
in Alg. 1; differences to the main loop of IC3 (cf. [22, Fig. 5]) are highlighted in red.
A particular difference is that PrIC3H is parameterized by a heuristic H for finding
suitable probabilities (see Chall. 3). Since the precise choice of H is irrelevant for the
soundness of PrIC3H , we defer a detailed discussion of suitable heuristics to Sec. 4.
As input, PrIC3H takes an MDPM = (S, sI, Act, P), a set B ⊆ S of bad states, and
a threshold λ ∈ [0, 1]. Since the input is never changed, we assume it to be globally
available, also to subroutines.As output,PrIC3H returnstrue if two consecutive frames
become equal. We hence say that PrIC3H is sound if it only returns true ifM is safe.
We will formalize soundness using Hoare triples. For precondition φ, postcondi-
tion ψ, and program P, the triple
{
φ
}
P
{
ψ
}
is valid (for partial correctness) if, when-
ever program P starts in a state satisfying precondition φ and terminates in some state
s′, then s′ satisfies postcondition ψ. Soundness of PrIC3H then means validity of the
triple {
true
}
safe, ← PrIC3H (M, B, λ)
{
safe ⇒ Prmax (sI |= ♦B) ≤ λ
}
.
Let us briefly go through the individual steps of PrIC3H in Alg. 1 and convince ourselves
that it is indeed sound. After that, we discuss why PrIC3H terminates and what happens
if it is unable to prove safety by finding two equal consecutive frames.
How PrIC3H works. Recall that PrIC3H maintains a sequence of frames F0, . . . , Fk
which is initialized in l. 1 with k = 1, F0 = 0, and F1 = 1, where the frame 1
maps every state to 1. Every time upon entering the while-loop in terms l. 2, the initial
segmentF0, . . . , Fk−1 satisfies allPrIC3 invariants (cf. Def. 3), whereas the full sequence
F0, . . . , Fk potentially violates frame-safety as it is possible that Fk[sI ] > λ.
In l. 3, procedure StrengthenH—detailed in Sect. 4—is called to restore all PrIC3
invariants on the entire frame sequence: It either returns true if successful or returns
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falseand a counterexample (in our case a subsystemof theMDP) if it was unable to do so.
To ensure soundness ofPrIC3H , it suffices thatStrengthenH restores thePrIC3 invariants
whenever it returns true. Formally, StrengthenH must meet the following specification:
Definition 4. Procedure StrengthenH is sound if the following Hoare triple is valid:{
PrIC3Inv (F0, . . . , Fk−1) ∧ Fk−1 ≤ Fk ∧ Φ (Fk−1) ≤ Fk
}
success, F0, . . . , Fk, ← StrengthenH (F0, . . . , Fk){
success ⇒ PrIC3Inv (F0, . . . , Fk)
}
.
If StrengthenH returns true, then a new frame Fk+1 = 1 is created in l. 5. After that, the
(now initial) segment F0, . . . , Fk again satisfies all PrIC3 invariants, whereas the full
sequence F0, . . . , Fk+1 potentially violates frame-safety at Fk+1. Propagation (l. 6) aims
to speed up termination by updating Fi+1[s] by Fi[s] iff this does not violate relative
inductivity. Consequently, the previously mentioned properties remain unchanged.
If StrengthenH returns false, the PrIC3 invariants—premises to Lem. 2 for witness-
ing safety—cannot be restored and PrIC3H terminates returning false (l. 4). Returning
false (also possible in l. 8) has by specification no affect on soundness of PrIC3H.
In l. 7, we check whether there exist two identical consecutive frames. If so, Lem. 2
yields that the MDP is safe; consequently, PrIC3H returns true. Otherwise, we incre-
ment k and are in the same setting as upon entering the loop, now with an increased
frame sequence; PrIC3H then performs another iteration. In summary, we obtain:
Theorem 1 (Soundness of PrIC3H). If StrengthenH is sound and Propagate does not
affect the PrIC3 invariants, then PrIC3H is sound, i.e., the following triple is valid:{
true
}
safe, ← PrIC3H (M, B, λ)
{
safe =⇒ Prmax (sI |= ♦B) ≤ λ
}
PrIC3H terminates for unsafe MDPs. If the MDP is unsafe, then there exists a step-
bound n, such that Prmax
(
sI |= ♦
≤nB
)
> λ. Furthermore, any sound implementation
of StrengthenH (cf. Def. 4) either immediately terminates PrIC3H by returning false
or restores the PrIC3 invariants for F0, . . . , Fk . If the former case never arises, then
StrengthenH will eventually restore the PrIC3 invariants for a frame sequence of length
k = n. By Lem. 1, we have Fn[sI ] ≥ Pr
max
(
sI |= ♦
≤nB
)
> λ contradicting frame-safety.
PrIC3H terminates for safe MDPs. Standard IC3 terminates on safe finite TSs as there
are only finitely many different frames, making every ascending chain of frames even-
tually stabilize. For us, frames map states to probabilities (Chall. 1), yielding infinitely
many possible frames even for finite MDPs. Hence, StrengthenH need not ever yield a
stabilizing chain of frames. If it continuously fails to stabilize while repeatedly reasoning
about the same set of states, we give up. PrIC3H checks this by comparing the subsystem
StrengthenH operates on with the one it operated on in the previous loop iteration (l. 8).
Theorem 2. If StrengthenH and Propagate terminate, then PrIC3H terminates.
Recovery Statement 2. For qual. reachability (λ = 0), PrIC3H never terminates in l. 8.
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It. 1 2 3 4 5
Fi F1 F1 F2 F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 F4 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
s0
5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9
s1 1
11/18 1 11/18 11/18 1 11/18 11/18 11/18 1 11/18 11/18 11/18 11/18 1
s2 1
1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1
s3 1 1 1
2/3 1 1 2/3 2/3 1 1 2/3 2/3 2/3 1 1
s4 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
s5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(a) Threshold λ = 5/9
It. 1 2 3 4
Fi F1 F1 F2 F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 F4
s0
9/10 9/10 9/10 9/10 9/10 9/10 9/10 9/10 9/10 9/10
s1 1
99/100 1 99/100 99/100 1 99/100 99/100 99/100 1
s2 1
81/100 1 81/100 81/100 1 81/100 81/100 81/100 1
s3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s4 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
s5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
(b) Threshold λ = 9/10
Fig. 2. Two runs of PrIC3H on the Markov chain induced by selecting action a in Fig. 1. For every
iteration, frames are recorded after invocation of StrengthenH .
PrIC3H is incomplete. Standard IC3 either proves safety or returns false and a
counterexample—a single path from the initial to a bad state. As single paths are
insufficient as counterexamples in MDPs (Chall. 2), PrIC3H instead returns a subsystem
of the MDP M provided by StrengthenH . However, as argued above, we cannot trust
StrengthenH to provide a stabilizing chain of frames. Reporting false thus only means
that the given MDP may be unsafe; the returned subsystem has to be analyzed further.
The full PrIC3 algorithm presented in Sect. 5 addresses this issue. Exploiting the
subsystem returned by PrIC3H , PrIC3 returns true if the MDP is safe; otherwise, it
returns false and provides a true counterexample witnessing that the MDP is unsafe.
Example 2. We conclude this section with two example executions of PrIC3H on a
simplified version of the MDP in Fig. 1. Assume that action b has been removed. Then,
for every state, exactly one action is enabled, i.e., we consider a Markov chain. Fig. 2
depicts the frame sequences computed by PrIC3H (for a reasonableH ) on that Markov
chain for two thresholds: 5/9 = Prmax (s0 |= ♦B) and 9/10. In particular, notice that proving
the coarser bound of 9/10 requires fewer frames than proving the exact bound of 5/9. △
4 Strengthening in PrIC3H
When the main loop of PrIC3H has created a new frame Fk = 1 in its previous iteration,
this frame may violate frame-safety (Def. 3.3) because of Fk[sI ] = 1  λ. The task of
StrengthenH is to restore the PrIC3 invariants on all frames F0, . . . , Fk . To this end, our
first obligation is to lower the value in frame i = k for state s = sI to δ = λ ∈ [0, 1].
We denote such an obligation by (i, s, δ). Observe that implicitly δ = 0 in the qualitative
case, i.e., when proving unreachability. An obligation (i, s, δ) is resolved by updating
the values assigned to state s in all frames F1, . . . , Fi to at most δ. That is, for all j ≤ i,
we set Fj [s] to the minimum of δ and the original value Fj [s]. Such an update affects
neither initiality nor the chain property (Defs. 3.1, 3.2). It may, however, violate relative
inductivity (Def. 3.4), i.e., Φ (Fi−1) ≤ Fi . Before resolving obligation (i, s, δ), we may
thus have to further decrease some entries in Fi−1 as well. Hence, resolving obligations
may spawn additional obligations which have to be resolved first to maintain relative
inductivity. In this section, we present a generic instance of StrengthenH meeting its
specification (Def. 4) and discuss its correctness.
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1 Q ← {(k, sI , λ)} ;
2 while Q not empty do
3 (i, s, δ) ← Q.popMin(); /* pop obligation with minimal frame index */
4 if i = 0 ∨ (s ∈ B ∧ δ < 1) then
/* possible counterexample given by subsystem consisting of
states popped from Q at some point */
5 return false, , Q.touched();
/* check whether Fi [s] ← δ violates relative inductivity */
6 if ∃a ∈ Act (s) : Φa (Fi−1) [s] > δ then for such an a
7 δ1, . . . , δn ←H (s, a, δ) ;
8 {s1, . . . , sn} ← Succs(s, a);
9 Q.push ((i − 1, s1, δ1) , . . . , (i − 1, sn, δn) , (i, s, δ));
10 else /* resolve (i, s, δ) without violating relative inductivity */
11 F1[s] ← min (F1[s], δ) ; . . . ; Fi [s] ← min (Fi [s], δ);
12 end /* Q empty; all obligations have been resolved */
13 return true, F0, . . . , Fk ,Q.touched();
Algorithm 2: StrengthenH (F0, . . . , Fk)
StrengthenH by example. StrengthenH is given by the pseudo code in Alg. 2; differ-
ences to standard IC3 (cf. [22, Fig. 6]) are highlighted in red. Intuitively, StrengthenH
attempts to recursively resolve all obligations until either both frame-safety and relative
inductivity are restored for all frames or it detects a potential counterexample justifying
why it is unable to do so. We first consider an execution where the latter does not arise:
Example 3. We zoom in on Ex. 2: Prior to the second iteration, we have created the
following three frames assigning values to the states s0, s5:
F0 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1), F1 = (5/9, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), and F2 = 1.
To keep track of unresolved obligations (i, s, δ), StrengthenH employs a priority queueQ
which pops obligations with minimal frame index i first. Our first step is to ensure frame-
safety of F2, i.e., alter F2 so that F2[s0] ≤ 5/9; we thus initialize the queue Q with the
initial obligation (2, s0, 5/9) (l. 1). To do so, we check whether updating F2[s0] to 5/9
would invalidate relative inductivity (l. 6). This is indeed the case:
Φ (F1) [s0] = 1/2 · F1[s1] + 1/2 · F1[s2] = 1  5/9.
To restore relative inductivity,StrengthenH spawns one new obligation for each relevant
successor of s0. These have to be resolved before retrying to resolve the old obligation.9
In contrast to standard IC3, spawning obligations involves finding suitable proba-
bilities δ (l. 7). In our example this means we have to spawn two obligations (1, s1, δ1)
and (1, s2, δ2) such that 1/2 · δ1 + 1/2 · δ2 ≤ 5/9. There are infinitely many choices for
δ1 and δ2 satisfying this inequality. Assume some heuristic H chooses δ1 = 11/18 and
9 We assume that the set Succs(s, a) = {s′ ∈ S | P(s, a, s′) > 0} of relevant a-successors of
state s is returned in some arbitrary, but fixed order.
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δ2 = 1/2; we thus push obligations (1, s1, 11/18), (1, s2, 1/2), and (2, s0, 5/9) (ll. 8, 9). In the
next iteration, we first pop obligation (1, s1, 11/18) (l. 3) and find that it can be resolved
without violating relative inductivity (l. 6). Hence, we set F1[s1] to 11/18 (l. 11); no new
obligation is spawned. Obligation (1, s2, 1/2) is resolved analogously; the updated frame
is F1 = (5/9, 11/18, 1/2, 1). Thereafter, our initial obligation (2, s0, 5/9) can be resolved as
well; relative inductivity is restored for F0, F1, F2. Hence, StrengthenH returns true
together with the updated frames. △
StrengthenH is sound. Let us briefly discuss why Alg. 2 meets the specification of a
sound implemenation of StrengthenH (Def. 4): First, we observe that Alg. 2 alters the
frames—and thus potentially invalidates the PrIC3 invariants—only in l. 11 by resolving
an obligation (i, s, δ) with Φ (Fi−1) [s] ≤ δ (due to the check in l. 6).
Let F 〈s 7→ δ〉 denote the frame F in which F[s] is set to δ, i.e.,
F 〈s 7→ δ〉 [s′] =
{
δ, if s′ = s,
F[s′], otherwise.
Indeed, resolving obligation (i, s, δ) in l. 11 lowers the values assigned to state s to
at most δ without invalidating the PrIC3 invariants:
Lemma 3. Let (i, s, δ) be an obligation and F0, . . . , Fi , for i > 0, be frames with
Φ (Fi−1) [s] ≤ δ. Then PrIC3Inv (F0, . . . , Fi) implies
PrIC3Inv
(
F0
〈
s 7→ min (F0[s], δ)
〉
, . . . , Fi
〈
s 7→ min (Fi[s], δ)
〉 )
.
Crucially, the precondition of Def. 4 guarantees that all PrIC3 invariants except frame
safety hold initially. Since these invariants are never invalidated due to Lem. 3, Alg. 2 is
a sound implementation of StrengthenH if it restores frame safety whenever it returns
true, i.e., once it leaves the loop with an empty obligation queueQ (ll. 12–13). Now, an
obligation (i, s, δ) is only popped from Q in l. 3. As (i, s, δ) is added to Q upon reaching
l. 9, the size of Q can only ever be reduced (without returning false) by resolving
(i, s, δ) in l. 11. Hence, Alg. 2 does not return true unless it restored frame safety by
resolving, amongst all other obligations, the initial obligation (k, sI, λ). Consequently:
Lemma 4. Procedure StrengthenH is sound, i.e., it satisfies the specification in Def. 4.
Theorem 3. Procedure PrIC3H is sound, i.e., satisfies the specification in Thm. 1.
We remark that, analogously to standard IC3, resolving an obligation in l. 11 may be
accompanied by generalization. That is, we attempt to update the values of multiple
states at once. Generalization is, however, highly non-trivial in a probabilistic setting.
We discuss three possible approaches to generalization in Sect. 6.2.
StrengthenH terminates.We now show that StrengthenH as in Alg. 2 terminates. The
only scenario in whichStrengthenH may not terminate is if it keeps spawning obligations
in l. 9. Let us thus look closer at how obligations are spawned: Whenever we detect
that resolving an obligation (i, s, δ) would violate relative inductivity for some action a
(l. 6), we first need to update the values of the successor states s1, . . . , sn ∈ Succs(s, a)
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in frame i−1, i.e., we push the obligations (i−1, s1, δ1), . . . , (i−1, sn, δn) which have to
be resolved first (ll. 7–9). It is noteworthy that, for a TS, a single action leads to a
single successor state s1. Alg. 2 employs a heuristic H to determine the probabilities
required for pushing obligations (l. 7). Assume for an obligation (i, s, δ) that the check
in l. 6 yields ∃a ∈ Act (s) : Φa (Fi−1) [s] > δ. Then H takes s, a, δ and reports some
probability δj for every a-successor sj of s. However, an arbitrary heuristic of type
H : S × Act × [0, 1] → [0, 1]∗ may lead to non-terminating behavior: If δ1, . . . , δn =
Fi−1[s1], . . . Fi−1[sn], then the heuristic has no effect. It is thus natural to require that an
adequate heuristic H yields probabilities such that the check Φa (Fi−1) [s] > δ in l. 6
cannot succeed twice for the same obligation (i, s, δ) and same action a. Formally, this
is guaranteed by the following:
Definition 5. HeuristicH is adequate if the following triple is valid (for any frame F):{
Succs(s, a) = s1, . . . , sn
}
δ1, . . . , δn ← H(s, a, δ){
Φa
(
F 〈s1 7→ δ1〉 . . . 〈sn 7→ δn〉
)
[s] ≤ δ
}
△
Details regarding our implementation of heuristicH are found in Section 6.1.
For an adequate heuristic, attempting to resolve an obligation (i, s, δ) (ll. 3 – 11)
either succeeds after spawning it at most |Act(s)| times or StrengthenH returns false.
By a similar argument, attempting to resolve an obligation (i > 0, s, ) leads to at
most
∑
a∈Act(s) |{s
′ ∈ S | P(s, a, s′) > 0}| other obligations of the form (i−1, s′, ).
Consequently, the total number of obligations spawned byAlg. 2is bounded. SinceAlg. 2
terminates if all obligations have been resolved (l. 12) and each of its loop iterations
either returns false, spawns obligations, or resolves an obligation, we conclude:
Lemma 5. StrengthenH(F0, . . . , Fk) terminates for every adequate heuristicH .
Recovery Statement 3. Let H be adequate. Then for qualitative reachability (λ = 0),
all obligations spawned by StrengthenH as in Alg. 2 are of the form (i, s, 0).
StrengthenH returns false. There are two cases in which StrengthenH fails to restore
the PrIC3 invariants and returns false. The first case (the left disjunct of l. 4) is that
we encounter an obligation for frame F0. Resolving such an obligation would inevitably
violate initiality; analogously to standard IC3, we thus return false.
The second case (the right disjunct of l. 4) is that we encounter an obligation
(i, s, δ) for a bad state s ∈ B with a probability δ < 1 (though, obviously, all s ∈ B have
probability=1). Resolving such an obligationwould inevitably prevents us from restoring
relative inductivity: If we updated Fi[s] to δ, we would haveΦ (Fi−1) [s] = 1 > δ = Fi[s].
Notice that, in contrast to standard IC3, this second case can occur in PrIC3:
Example 4. Assume we have to resolve an obligation (i, s3, 1/2) for the MDP in Fig. 1.
This involves spawning obligations (i−1, s4, δ1) and (i−1, s5, δ2), where s5 is a bad state,
such that 1/3 · δ1 + 2/3 · δ2 ≤ 1/2. Even for δ1 = 0, this is only possible if δ2 ≤ 3/4 < 1. △
StrengthenH cannot prove unsafety. If standard IC3 returns false, it proves unsafety
by constructing a counterexample, i.e., a single path from the initial state to a bad state.
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Data: global MDPM, set of bad states B, threshold λ
Result: true iff Prmax (sI |= ♦B) ≤ λ
1 Ω ← Initialize(); touched ← {sI };
2 do
3 H ← CreateHeuristic(Ω);
4 safe, subsystem ← PrIC3H();
5 if safe then return true ;
6 if CheckRefutation(subsystem) then return false ;
7 touched ← Enlarge(touched, subsystem);
8 Ω ← Refine(Ω, touched);
9 while touched , S;
10 return Ω(s) ≤ λ
Algorithm 3: PrIC3: The outermost loop dealing with possibly imprecise heuristics
If PrIC3 returns false, there are two possible reasons: Either theMDP is indeed unsafe,
or the heuristicH at some point selected probabilities in a way such that StrengthenH
is unable to restore the PrIC3 invariants (even though the MDP might in fact be safe).
StrengthenH thus only returns a potential counterexample which either proves unsafety
or indicates that our heuristic was inappropriate.
Counterexamples in our case consist of subsystems rather than a single path (see
Chall. 2 and Sec. 5). StrengthenH hence returns the set Q.touched() of all states that
eventually appeared in the obligation queue. This set is a conservative approximation,
and optimizations as in [1] may be beneficial. Furthermore, in the qualitative case, our
potential counterexample subsumes the counterexamples constructed by standard IC3:
Recovery Statement 4. LetH0 be an adequate heuristic mapping only to values 0 or 1.
Such a heuristic simply needs to check whether Succs(s, a) ∩ B , ∅. For qualitative
reachability (λ = 0), if success = false is returned by StrengthenH0 (F0, . . . , Fk), then
Q.touched() contains a path from the initial to a bad state.10
5 Dealing with Potential Counterexamples
Recall that our core algorithm PrIC3H is incomplete for a fixed heuristic H : It cannot
give a conclusive answer whenever it finds a potential counterexample for two possible
reasons: Either the heuristic H turned out to be inappropriate or the MDP is indeed
unsafe. The idea to overcome the former is to call PrIC3H finitely often in an outer
loop that generates new heuristics until we find an appropriate one: If PrIC3H still
does not report safety of the MDP, then it is indeed unsafe. We do not blindly generate
new heuristics, but use the potential counterexamples returned by PrIC3H to refine the
previous one.
Let consider the procedure PrIC3 in Alg. 3 which wraps our core algorithm PrIC3H
in more detail: First, we create an oracle Ω : S → [0, 1] which (roughly) estimates the
probability of reaching B for every state. A perfect oracle would yield precisemaximal
reachability probabilites, i.e., Ω(s) = Prmax (s |= ♦B) for every state s. We construct
10 Q.touched() might be restricted to only contain this path by some simple adaptions.
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oracles by user-supplied methods (highlighted in blue). Examples of implementations
of all user-supplied methods in Alg. 3 are discussed in Sect. 7.
Assuming the oracle is good, but not perfect, we construct an adequate heuristicH
selecting probabilities based on the oracle11 for all successors of a given state: There
are various options. The simplest is to pass-through the oracle values. A version that is
more robust against noise in the oracle is discussed in Sect. 6. We then invoke PrIC3H .
If PrIC3H reports safety, the MDP is indeed safe by the soundness of PrIC3H.
Check refutation. If PrIC3H does not report safety, it reports a subsystem that hints to
a potential counterexample. Formally, this subsystem is a subMDP of states that were
‘visited’ during the invocation of StrengthenH .
Definition 6 (subMDP). Let M = (S, sI, Act, P) be an MDP and let S′ ⊆ S with
sI ∈ S
′. We call MS′ = (S
′, sI, Act, P′) the subMDP induced by M and S′, where for
all s, s′ ∈ S′ and all a ∈ Act, we have P′(s, a, s′) = P(s, a, s′). △
A subMDP MS′ may be substochastic where missing probability mass never reaches a
bad state. Def. 1 is thus relaxed: For all states s ∈ S′ we require that
∑
s′∈S′ P(s, a, s
′) ≤
1.If the subsystem is unsafe, we can conclude that the original MDPM is also safe.
Lemma 6. IfM′ is a subMDP ofM andM′ is unsafe, thenM is also unsafe.
The role of CheckRefutation is to establish whether the subsystem is indeed a true
counterexample or a spurious one. Formally, CheckRefutation should ensure:{
true
}
res ← CheckRefutation (subsystem)
{
res = true ⇔ Msubsystem unsafe
}
.
Again, PrIC3 is backward compatible in the sense that a single fixed heuristic is always
sufficient when reasoning about reachability (λ = 0).
Recovery Statement 5. For qualitative reachability (λ = 0) and the heuristicH0 from
Recovery Statement 4, PrIC3 invokes its core PrIC3H exactly once.
This statement is true, as PrIC3H returns either safe or a subsystem containing a path
from the initial state to a bad state. In the latter case, CheckRefutation detects that
the subsystem is indeed a counterexample which cannot be spurious in the qualitative
setting.
We remark that the procedureCheckRefutation invoked in l. 6 is a classical fallback; it
runs an (alternative)model checking algorithm, e.g., solving the set ofBellman equations,
for the subsystem. In the worst case, i.e., for S′ = S, we thus solve exactly our problem
statement. In the empirical evaluation (Table 1), we observed that, for reasonable oracles,
the procedureCheckRefutation is often only invoked on significantly smaller subMDPs.
In the worst, case, however, the subMDP has to include all paths of the original system,
and therefore then coincides.
Refine oracle. Whenever we have neither proven the MDP safe nor unsafe, we re-
fine the oracle to prevent generating the same subsystem in the next invocation of
PrIC3H . To ensure termination, oracles should only be refined finitely often. That is,
11 We thus assume that heuristicH invokes the oracle whenever it needs to guess some probability.
16 K. Batz, S. Junges, B. Kaminski, J.-P. Katoen, C. Matheja, P. Schröer
module ex
c : [0..20] init 0; f : [0..1] init 0;
[] c<20 -> 0.1:(f’=1) + 0.9:(c’=c+1); // cmd 1
[] c<10 -> 0.2:(f’=1) + 0.8:(c’=c+2);
endmodule
(a) Prism code snippet
c=2, f=0
c=2, f=1c=3, f=0 c=4, f=0
cmd1 cmd2
0.10.9 0.2 0.8
(b) Part of the corresponding MDP
Fig. 3. Illustrative Prism-style probabilistic guarded command language example
we need some progress measure. The set touched overapproximates all counterexam-
ples encountered in some invocation of PrIC3H and we propose to use its size as
the progress measure. While there are several possibilities to update touched through
the user-defined procedure Enlarge (l. 7), every implementation should hence satisfy{
true
}
touched′ ← Enlarge(touched, )
{
|touched′ | > |touched|
}
. Consequently,
after finitely many iterations, the oracle is refined with respect to all states. In this case,
we may as well rely on solving the characteristic LP problem:
Lemma 7. The algorithm PrIC3 in Alg. 3 is sound and complete if Refine(Ω, S) returns
a perfect oracle Ω (with S is the set of all states).
Weaker assumptions on Refine are possible, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
Moreover, the above lemma does not rely on the abstract concept that heuristic H
provides suitable probabilities after finitely many refinements.12
6 Practical PrIC3
So far, we gave a conceptual view on PrIC3, but now take a more practical stance. We
detail important features of effective implementations of PrIC3 (based on our empiri-
cal evaluation). We first describe an implementation without generalization, and then
provide a prototypical extension that allows for three variants of generalization.
6.1 A Concrete PrIC3 Instance without Generalization
Input.We describeMDPs using the Prism guarded command language13, exemplified in
Fig. 3. States are described by valuations to m (integer-valued) program variables vars,
and outgoing actions are described by commands of the form
[] guard -> prob1 : update1 & ... & probk : updatek
Concretely: if a state s satisfies guard, then the corresponding outgoing action exists,
with k branches whose probabilities are given by probi, and which lead to states
described by updatei, see Fig. 3b.
12 One could of course now also create a heuristic that is trivial for a perfect oracle and invoke
PrIC3H with the heuristic for the perfect oracle, but there really is no benefit in doing so.
13 Preprocessing ensures a single thread (module) and no deadlocks.
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Encoding. We encode frames as logical formulae. Updating frames then corresponds
to adding conjuncts, and checking for relative inductivity is a satisfiability call. Our
encoding is as follows: States are assignments to the programvariables, i.e.,States = Zm.
We use various uninterpreted functions, to whom we give semantics using appropriate
constraints. Frames14 are represented by uninterpreted functions Frame : States → R
satisfying Frame (s) = d implies F[s] ≥ d. Likewise, the Bellman operator is an
uninterpreted function Phi : States → R such that Phi (s) = d implies Φ (F) [s] ≥ d.
Finally, we use Bad : States→ B with Bad (s) iff s ∈ B.
Among the appropriate constraints, we ensure that variables are within their range,
bound the values for the frames, and enforce Phi (s) = 1 for s ∈ B. We encode the
guarded commands as exemplified by this encoding of the first command in Fig. 3:
∀ s ∈ States : ¬Bad (s) ∧ s[c] < 20
=⇒ Phi (s) = 0.1 · Frame ((s[c], 1)) + 0.9 · Frame ((s[c] + 1, s[ f ])) .
In our implementation, we optimize the encoding. We avoid the uninterpreted functions
by applying an adapted Ackerman reduction. We avoid universal quantifiers, by first
observing that we always ask whether a single state is not inductive, and then unfolding
the guarded commands in the constraints that describe a frame. That encoding grows
linear in the size of the maximal out-degree of the MDP, and is in the quantifier-free
fragment of linear arithmetic (QFLRIA).
Heuristic.We select probabilities δi by solving the following optimization problem,with
variables xi , range(xi) ∈ [0, 1], for states si ∈ Succs(s, a) and oracle Ω15.
minimize
k∑
i
si<B
 xi∑k
j=1 xj
−
Ω (si)∑n
j=1Ω
(
sj
)  s.t. δ =
k∑
i=1
P(s, a, si) ·
{
1, if si ∈ B,
xi, else.
The constraint ensures that, if the values xi correspond to the actual reachability proba-
bilities from si , then the reachability from state s is exactly δ. A constraint stating that
δ ≥ . . . would also be sound, but we choose equality as it preserves room between the
actual probability and the threshold we want to show. Finally, the objective function
aims to preserve the ratio between the suggested probabilities.
Repushing and breaking cycles. Repushing [22] is an essential ingredient of both
standard IC3 and PrIC3. Intuitively, we avoid opening new frames and spawning obliga-
tions that can be deduced from current information. Since repushing generates further
obligations in the current frame, its implementation requires that the detection of Zeno-
behavior has to be moved from PrIC3H into the StrengthenH procedure. Therefore, we
track the histories of the obligations in the queue. Furthermore, once we detect a cycle
we first try to adapt the heuristicH locally to overcome this cyclic behavior instead of
immediately giving up. This local adaption reduces the number of PrIC3H invocations.
Extended queue. In contrast to standard IC3, the obligation queue might contain entries
that vary only in their δ entry. In particular, if the MDP is not a tree, it may occur that the
14 In each operation, we only consider a single frame.
15 If maxΩ(sj) = 0, we assume ∀ j .Ω(sj ) = 0.5. If δ = 0, we omit rescaling to allow
∑
xj = 0.
18 K. Batz, S. Junges, B. Kaminski, J.-P. Katoen, C. Matheja, P. Schröer
queue contains both (i, s, δ) and (i, s, δ′) with δ > δ′. Then, (i, s, δ′) can be safely pruned
from the queue. Similarly, after handling (i, s, δ), if some fresh obligation (i, s, δ′′ > δ) is
pushed to the queue, it can be substituted with (i, s, δ). To efficiently operationalize these
observations, we keep an additional mapping which remains intact over multiple invo-
cations of StrengthenH . We furthermore employed some optimizations for Q.touched()
aiming to track potential counterexamples better. After refining the heuristic, one may
want to reuse frames or the obligation queue, but empirically this leads to performance
degradation as the values in the frames are inconsistent with behavior suggested by the
heuristic.
6.2 Concrete PrIC3 with Generalization
So far, frames are updated by changing single entries whenever we resolve obligations
(i, s, δ), i.e., we add conjunctions of the form Fi[s] ≤ δ. Equivalently, we may add a
constraint ∀s′ ∈ S : Fi[s′] ≤ p{s}(s′) with p{s}(s) = δ and p{s} = 1 for all s′ , s.
Generalization in IC3 aims to update a set G (including s) of states in a frame
rather than a single one without invalidating relative inductivity. In our setting, we thus
consider a function pG : G → [0, 1] with pG(s) ≤ δ that assigns (possibly different)
probabilities to all states in G. Updating a frame then amounts to adding the constraint
∀ s ∈ States: s ∈ G =⇒ Frame (s) ≤ pG(s).
Standard IC3 generalizes by iteratively “dropping” a variable, say v. The set G then
consists of all states that do not differ from the fixed state s except for the value of
v.16 We take the same approach by iteratively dropping program variables. Hence, pG
effectively becomes a mapping from the value s[v] to a probability.
We experimentedwith four types of functions pG that we describe forMarkov chains.
The ideas are briefly outlined below; details are beyond the scope of this paper.
Constant pG . Setting all s ∈ G to δ is straightforward but empirically not helpful and
therefore not further considered.
Linear interpolation.We use a linear function pG that interpolates two points. The first
point (s[v], δ) is obtained from the obligation (i, s, δ). For a second point, consider the
following: Let Com be the unique17 command active at state s. Among all states in G
that are enabled in the guard of Com, we take the state s′ in which s′[v] is maximal18.
The second point for interpolation is then (s′[v],Φ (Fi−1) [s′]). If the relative inductivity
fails for pG we do not generalize with pG , but may attempt to find other functions.
Polynomial interpolation. Rather than linearly interpolating between two points, we
may interpolate using more than two points. In order to properly fit these points, we
can use a higher-degree polynomial. We select these points using counterexamples to
generalization (CTGs):We start as above with linear interpolation. However, if pG is not
relative inductive, the SMT solver yields a model with state s′′ ∈ G and probability δ′′,
16 Formally, G = {s′ | for all v′ ∈ vars \ {v} : s′(v′) = s(v′)}.
17 Recall that we have a Markov chain consisting of a single module
18 This implicitly assumes that v is increased. Adaptions are possible.
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with s′′ violating relative inductivity, i.e.,Φ (Fi−1) [s′′] > δ′′. We call (s′′,Φ (Fi−1) [s′′])
a CTG, and (s′′[v],Φ (Fi−1) [s′′])) is then a further interpolation point, and we repeat.
Technically, when generalizing using nonlinear constraints, we use real-valued arith-
metic with a branch-and-bound-style approach to ensure integer values.
Hybrid interpolation. In polynomial interpolation, we generate high-degree polynomi-
als and add them to the encoding of the frame. In subsequent invocations, reasoning
efficiency is drastically harmed by these high-degree polynomials. Instead, we soundly
approximate pG by a piecewise linear function, and use these constraints in the frame.
7 Experiments
We assess how PrIC3 may contribute to the state of the art in probabilistic model
checking. We do some early empirical evaluation showing that PrIC3 is feasible. We see
ample room for further improvements of the prototype.
Implementation.We implemented a prototype19 of PrIC3 based on Sect. 6.1 in Python.
The input is represented using efficient data structures provided by the model checker
Storm. We use an incremental instance of Z3 [46] for each frame, as suggested in [22].
A solver for each frame is important to reduce the time spent on pushing the large
frame-encodings. The optimization problem in the heuristic is also solved using Z3. All
previously discussed generalizations (none, linear, polynomial, hybrid) are supported.
Oracle and refinement. We support the (pre)computation of four different types of
oracles for the initialization step in Alg. 3: (1) A perfect oracle solving exactly the
Bellman equations. Such an oracle is unrealistic, but interesting from a conceptual point.
(2) Relative frequencies by recording all visited states during simulation. This idea is a
naïve simplification of Q-learning. (3) Model checking with decision diagrams (DDs)
and few value iterations. Often, a DD representation of a model can be computed fast,
and the challenge is in executing sufficient value iterations. We investigate whether
doing few value iterations yields a valuable oracle (and covers states close to bad states).
(4) Solving a (pessimistic) LP fromBFS partial exploration. States that are not expanded
are assumed bad. Roughly, this yields oracles covering states close to the initial states.
To implement Refine (cf. Alg. 3, l. 8), we create an LP for the subMDP induced by
the touched states. For states whose successors are not in the touched states, we add a
transition to B labeled with the oracle value as probability. The solution of the resulting
LP updates the entries corresponding to the touched states.
For Enlarge (cf. Alg. 3, l. 7), we take the union of the subsystem and the touched
states. If this does not change the set of touched states, we also add its successors.
Setup. We evaluate the run time and memory consumption of our prototype of PrIC3.
We choose a combination of models from the literature (BRP [20], ZeroConf [17]) and
some structurally straightforward variants of grids (chain, double chain; see App. A).
Since our prototype lacks the sophisticated preprocessing applied by many state-of-
the-art model checkers, it is more sensitive to the precise encoding of a model, e.g.,
the number of commands. To account for this, we generated our own encodings for
19 The prototype is available open-source from https://github.com/moves-rwth/PrIC3 .
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Table 1. Empirical results. Run times are in seconds; time out = 15 minutes.
|S | Prmax (sI |= ♦B) λ w/o |sub | lin |sub | pol |sub | hyb |sub | Stormsparse Stormdd
B
R
P
103 0.035
0.1 TO – TO – TO – TO – <0.1 0.12
0.01 51.3 324 125.8 324 TO – MO – <0.1 0.18
0.005 10.9 188 38.3 188 TO – MO – <0.1 0.1
Z
er
oC
on
f 10
4 0.5
0.9 TO – TO – 0.4 0 0.1 0 <0.1 296.8
0.75 TO – TO – 0.3 0 0.2 0 <0.1 286.9
0.52 TO – TO – 0.2 0 0.2 0 <0.1 282.6
0.45 <0.1 1 <0.1 1 <0.1 1 <0.1 1 <0.1 300.2
109 ∼0.55
0.9 TO – TO – 3.7 0 MO – MO TO
0.75 TO – TO – 3.4 0 MO – MO TO
0.52 TO – TO – TO – TO – MO TO
0.45 <0.1 1 <0.1 1 <0.1 1 <0.1 1 MO TO
C
ha
in
103 0.394
0.9 18.8 0 60.2 0 1.2 0 0.3 0 <0.1 <0.1
0.4 20.1 0 55.4 0 0.9 0 TO – <0.1 <0.1
0.35 91.8 431 119.5 431 TO – TO – <0.1 <0.1
0.3 46.1 357 64.0 357 TO – TO – <0.1 <0.1
104 0.394
0.9 TO – TO – 1.6 0 0.3 0 <0.1 4.5
0.48 TO – TO – 1.4 0 MO – <0.1 4.8
0.4 TO – TO – 1.4 0 TO – <0.1 4.9
0.3 TO – TO – TO – TO – <0.1 4.9
1012 0.394
0.9 TO – TO – 6.4 0 MO – MO TO
0.4 TO – TO – 6.0 0 MO – MO TO
D
ou
bl
e
C
ha
in 10
3 0.215
0.9 528.1 0 828.8 0 203.3 0 0.6 0 <0.1 <0.1
0.3 588.4 0 TO – 138.3 0 0.5 0 <0.1 <0.1
0.216 597.4 0 TO – 765.8 0 MO – <0.1 <0.1
0.15 TO – TO – TO – TO – <0.1 <0.1
104 0.22
0.9 TO – TO – 16.8 0 0.5 0 0.2 2.8
0.3 TO – TO – 17.5 0 0.5 0 0.2 2.6
0.24 TO – TO – 16.8 0 MO – 0.2 2.7
107 2.6E−4
4E−3 TO – TO – TO – MO – TO TO
2.7E−4 TO – TO – 281.2 0 – MO – TO TO
all models. All experiments were conducted on an single core of an IntelÂő XeonÂő
Platinum 8160 processor. We use a 15 minute time-limit and report TO otherwise.
Memory is limited to 8GB; we report MO if it is exceeded. Apart from the oracle, all
parameters of our prototype remain fixed over all experiments. To give an impression
of the reported run times, we compare our prototype with both the explicit (Stormsparse)
and DD-based (Stormdd) engine of the state-of-the-art model checker Storm 1.4, which
compared favourably in QComp 2019 [28].
Results. In Table 1, we present the run times for various invocations of our prototype
and Oracle 420. In particular, we give the model name and the number of (non-trivial)
states in the particular instance, and the (estimated) actual probability to reach B. For
each model, we consider multiple thresholds λ. The next 8 columns report on the four
variants of PrIC3with varying generalization schemes. Besides the scheme with the run
times, we report for each scheme the number of states of the largest (last) subsystem that
CheckRefutation in Alg. 3, l. 6 was invoked upon (column |sub|). The last two columns
report on the run times for Storm that we provide for comparison. In each row, we mark
with purple MDPs that are unsafe, i.e., PrIC3 refutes these MDPs for the given threshold
λ. We highlight the best configurations of PrIC3.
Discussion.Our experiments give amixed picture on the performance of our prototypical
implementation of PrIC3. On the one hand, Storm significantly outperforms PrIC3 on
20 We explore min{|S |, 5000} states using BFS and Storm.
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small models with up to 104 states. Further optimizations are required to reduce the
number of TO’s. On the other hand, PrIC3 is capable of reasoning about huge, yet
simple, models with up to 1012 states that Storm is unable to analyze either within
the time limit or memory limit. There is more empirical evidence that PrIC3 may
complement state-of-the-art probabilistic model checkers:
First, the size of thresholds matters. Our benchmarks show that—at least without
generalization—more “wiggle room” between the precise maximal reachability proba-
bility and the threshold generally leads to a better performance. PrIC3 may thus prove
bounds for largemodelswhere a precise quantitative reachability analysis is out of scope.
Second, PrIC3 enjoys the benefits of bounded model checking. In some cases, e.g.,
ZeroConf for λ = 0.45, PrIC3 refutes very fast as it does need to build the whole model.
Third, if PrIC3 proves the safety of the system, it does so without relying on checking
large subsystems in the CheckRefutation step.
Fourth, generalization is crucial. Without generalization, PrIC3 is unable to prove
safety for any of the considered models with more than 103 states. With generalization,
however, it can prove safety for very large systems and thresholds close to the exact
reachability probability. For example, it proved safety of the Chain benchmarkwith 1012
states for a threshold of 0.4 which differs from the exact reachability probability by
0.006.
Fifth, there is no best generalization. There is no clear winner out of the considered
generalization approaches. Linear generalization always performs worse than the other
ones. In fact, it performs worse than no generalization at all. The hybrid approach,
however, occasionally has the edge over the polynomial approach. This indicates that
more research is required to find suitable generalizations.
In Appendix A, we also compare the additional three types of oracles (1–3). We
observed that only few oracle refinements are needed to prove safety; for small models
at most one refinement was sufficient. However, this does not hold if the given MDP is
unsafe. DoubleChain with λ = 0.15, for example, and Oracle 2 requires 25 refinements.
8 Conclusion
We have presented PrIC3—the first truly probabilistic, yet conservative, extension of
IC3 to quantitative reachability in MDPs. Our theoretical development is accompanied
by a prototypical implementation and experiments. We believe there is ample space for
improvements including an in-depth investigation of suitable oracles and generalizations.
References
1. Ábrahám, E., Becker, B., Dehnert, C., Jansen, N., Katoen, J., Wimmer, R.: Counterexample
generation for discrete-time markov models: An introductory survey. SFM. LNCS 8483, pp.
65–121. Springer (2014)
2. Agha, G., Palmskog, K.: A survey of statistical model checking. ACMTrans. Model. Comput.
Simul. 28(1), 6:1–6:39 (2018)
3. Agrawal, S., Chatterjee, K., Novotný, P.: Lexicographic ranking supermartingales: an efficient
approach to termination of probabilistic programs. PACMPL 2(POPL), 34:1–34:32 (2018)
22 K. Batz, S. Junges, B. Kaminski, J.-P. Katoen, C. Matheja, P. Schröer
4. de Alfaro, L., Kwiatkowska, M.Z., Norman, G., Parker, D., Segala, R.: Symbolic model
checking of probabilistic processes using mtbdds and the kronecker representation. TACAS.
LNCS 1785, pp. 395–410. Springer (2000)
5. Baier, C., de Alfaro, L., Forejt, V., Kwiatkowska, M.: Model checking probabilistic systems.
Handbook of Model Checking, pp. 963–999. Springer (2018)
6. Baier, C., Hermanns, H., Katoen, J.P.: The 10, 000 facets ofMDPmodel checking. Computing
and Software Science, LNCS 10000, pp. 420–451. Springer (2019)
7. Baier, C., Katoen, J.P.: Principles of model checking. MIT Press (2008)
8. Baier, C., Klein, J., Leuschner, L., Parker, D., Wunderlich, S.: Ensuring the reliability of your
model checker: Interval iteration for Markov decision processes. CAV (1). LNCS 10426, pp.
160–180. Springer (2017)
9. Barthe, G., Espitau, T., Fioriti, L.M.F., Hsu, J.: Synthesizing probabilistic invariants via
doob’s decomposition. CAV (1). LNCS 9779, pp. 43–61. Springer (2016)
10. Bartocci, E., Kovács, L., Stankovic, M.: Automatic generation of moment-based invariants
for prob-solvable loops. ATVA. LNCS 11781, pp. 255–276. Springer (2019)
11. Biere, A.: Bounded model checking. Handbook of Satisfiability, Frontiers in Artificial Intel-
ligence and Applications 185, pp. 457–481. IOS Press (2009)
12. Bradley, A.R.: SAT-based model checking without unrolling. VMCAI. LNCS 6538, pp. 70–
87. Springer (2011)
13. Brázdil, T., Chatterjee, K., Chmelik, M., Forejt, V., Kretínský, J., Kwiatkowska, M.Z., Parker,
D., Ujma, M.: Verification of Markov decision processes using learning algorithms. ATVA.
LNCS 8837, pp. 98–114. Springer (2014)
14. Chadha, R., Viswanathan, M.: A counterexample-guided abstraction-refinement framework
for Markov decision processes. ACM Trans. Comput. Log. 12(1), 1:1–1:49 (2010)
15. Chakarov, A., Sankaranarayanan, S.: Probabilistic program analysis with martingales. CAV.
LNCS 8044, pp. 511–526. Springer (2013)
16. Chakraborty, S., Fried, D., Meel, K.S., Vardi, M.Y.: From weighted to unweighted model
counting. IJCAI. pp. 689–695. AAAI Press (2015)
17. Cheshire, S., Aboba, B., Guttman, E.: Dynamic configuration of ipv4 link-local addresses.
RFC 3927, 1–33 (2005)
18. Cimatti, A., Griggio, A., Mover, S., Tonetta, S.: Infinite-state invariant checking with IC3 and
predicate abstraction. FMSD 49(3), 190–218 (2016)
19. D’Argenio, P.R., Hartmanns, A., Sedwards, S.: Lightweight statistical model checking in
nondeterministic continuous time. ISoLA. LNCS 11245, pp. 336–353. Springer (2018)
20. D’Argenio, P.R., Jeannet, B., Jensen, H.E., Larsen, K.G.: Reachability analysis of proba-
bilistic systems by successive refinements. PAPM-PROBMIV. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 2165, pp. 39–56. Springer (2001)
21. Dehnert, C., Junges, S., Katoen, J.P., Volk, M.: A storm is coming: A modern probabilistic
model checker. CAV (2). LNCS 10427, pp. 592–600. Springer (2017)
22. Eén, N., Mishchenko, A., Brayton, R.K.: Efficient implementation of property directed reach-
ability. FMCAD. pp. 125–134. FMCAD Inc. (2011)
23. Fränzle, M., Hermanns, H., Teige, T.: Stochastic satisfiability modulo theory: A novel tech-
nique for the analysis of probabilistic hybrid systems. HSCC. LNCS 4981, pp. 172–186.
Springer (2008)
24. Gretz, F., Katoen, J.P.,McIver, A.: Prinsys - on a quest for probabilistic loop invariants. QEST.
LNCS 8054, pp. 193–208. Springer (2013)
25. Gretz, F., Katoen, J.P., McIver, A.: Operational versus weakest pre-expectation semantics for
the probabilistic guarded command language. Perform. Eval. 73, 110–132 (2014)
26. Gurfinkel, A., Ivrii, A.: Pushing to the top. FMCAD. pp. 65–72. IEEE (2015)
27. Haddad, S.,Monmege, B.: Interval iteration algorithm for MDPs and IMDPs. Theor. Comput.
Sci. 735, 111–131 (2018)
PrIC3: Property Directed Reachability for MDPs 23
28. Hahn, E.M., Hartmanns, A., Hensel, C., Klauck, M., Klein, J., Kretínský, J., Parker, D.,
Quatmann, T., Ruijters, E., Steinmetz, M.: The 2019 comparison of tools for the analysis of
quantitative formal models - (qcomp 2019 competition report). TACAS (3). LNCS 11429,
pp. 69–92. Springer (2019)
29. Hahn, E.M., Hermanns, H., Wachter, B., Zhang, L.: PASS: abstraction refinement for infinite
probabilistic models. TACAS. LNCS 6015, pp. 353–357. Springer (2010)
30. Hahn, E.M., Li, Y., Schewe, S., Turrini, A., Zhang, L.: iscasmc: A web-based probabilistic
model checker. FM. LNCS 8442, pp. 312–317. Springer (2014)
31. Han, T., Katoen, J.P., Damman, B.: Counterexample generation in probabilistic model check-
ing. IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 35(2), 241–257 (2009)
32. Hark, M., Kaminski, B.L., Giesl, J., Katoen, J.P.: Aiming low is harder: Induction for lower
bounds in probabilistic program verification. PACMPL 4(POPL), 37:1–37:28 (2020)
33. Hartmanns, A., Hermanns, H.: Themodest toolset: An integrated environment for quantitative
modelling and verification. TACAS. LNCS 8413, pp. 593–598. Springer (2014)
34. Hartmanns, A., Kaminski, B.L.: Optimistic value iteration. CAV. LNCS, Springer (2020), [to
appear]
35. Hassan, Z., Bradley, A.R., Somenzi, F.: Better generalization in IC3. FMCAD. pp. 157–164.
IEEE (2013)
36. Hermanns, H.,Wachter, B., Zhang, L.: Probabilistic CEGAR.CAV. LNCS5123, pp. 162–175.
Springer (2008)
37. Hoder, K., Bjørner, N.: Generalized property directed reachability. SAT. LNCS 7317, pp.
157–171. Springer (2012)
38. Kaminski, B.L.: Advanced Weakest Precondition Calculi for Probabilis-
tic Programs. Ph.D. thesis, RWTH Aachen University, Germany (2019),
http://publications.rwth-aachen.de/record/755408/files/755408.pdf
39. Kaminski, B.L., Katoen, J.P., Matheja, C., Olmedo, F.: Weakest precondition reasoning for
expected runtimes of randomized algorithms. J. ACM 65(5), 30:1–30:68 (2018)
40. Kattenbelt, M., Kwiatkowska, M.Z., Norman, G., Parker, D.: A game-based abstraction-
refinement framework for Markov decision processes. FMSD 36(3), 246–280 (2010)
41. Kozen, D.: A probabilistic PDL. STOC. pp. 291–297. ACM (1983)
42. Kwiatkowska, M.Z., Norman, G., Parker, D.: PRISM 4.0: Verification of probabilistic real-
time systems. CAV. LNCS 6806, pp. 585–591. Springer (2011)
43. Lange, T., Neuhäußer, M.R., Noll, T., Katoen, J.P.: IC3 software model checking. STTT
(2020)
44. Lassez, J.L., Nguyen, V.L., Sonenberg, L.: Fixed point theorems and semantics: A folk tale.
Inf. Process. Lett. 14(3), 112–116 (1982)
45. McIver, A., Morgan, C.: Abstraction, Refinement and Proof for Probabilistic Systems. Mono-
graphs in Computer Science, Springer (2005)
46. de Moura, L.M., Bjørner, N.: Z3: an efficient SMT solver. TACAS. LNCS 4963, pp. 337–340.
Springer (2008)
47. Park, D.: Fixpoint induction and proofs of program properties. Machine intelligence 5 (1969)
48. Polgreen, E., Brain, M., Fränzle, M., Abate, A.: Verifying reachability properties in Markov
chains via incremental induction. CoRR abs/1909.08017 (2019)
49. Puterman, M.L.: Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming.
Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, Wiley (1994)
50. Quatmann, T., Katoen, J.P.: Sound value iteration. CAV. LNCS 10981, pp. 643–661. Springer
(2018)
51. Rabe, M.N., Wintersteiger, C.M., Kugler, H., Yordanov, B., Hamadi, Y.: Symbolic approxi-
mation of the bounded reachability probability in large Markov chains. QEST. LNCS 8657,
pp. 388–403. Springer (2014)
24 K. Batz, S. Junges, B. Kaminski, J.-P. Katoen, C. Matheja, P. Schröer
52. Seufert, T., Scholl, C.: Sequential verification using reverse PDR. MBMV. pp. 79–90. Shaker
Verlag (2017)
53. Suenaga, K., Ishizawa, T.: Generalized property-directed reachability for hybrid systems.
VMCAI. LNCS 11990, pp. 293–313. Springer (2020)
54. Takisaka, T., Oyabu, Y., Urabe, N., Hasuo, I.: Ranking and repulsing supermartingales for
reachability in probabilistic programs. ATVA. LNCS 11138, pp. 476–493. Springer (2018)
55. Vazquez-Chanlatte, M., Rabe, M.N., Seshia, S.A.: A model counter’s guide to probabilistic
systems. CoRR abs/1903.09354 (2019)
56. Wimmer, R., Braitling, B., Becker, B.: Counterexample generation for discrete-time Markov
chains using bounded model checking. VMCAI. LNCS 5403, pp. 366–380. Springer (2009)
PrIC3: Property Directed Reachability for MDPs 25
A Further details for the experiments
module chain
c : [0..N] init 0; f : [0..1] init 0;
[] c<N-> p:(c’=c+1) + (1-p):(f’=1);
endmodule
label bad = f’=1
module double_chain
c : [0..N] init 0; f : [0..1] init 0; g : [0..1] init 0;
[] c<N & g=0 -> p1:(c’=c+1) + p2:(g’=1) + p3 : (f’ =1);
[] c<N & g=1 -> q:(c’=c+1) + (1-q): (f’=1);
endmodule
label bad = f’=1
Fig. 4. Prism code for examples Chain and Double Chain
In Fig. 4, we depict the precise encoding of the two variants of chains.
For Table 2 (alternative oracles), we use only the smallest models from Table 1 as
we focus on the effect of the oracles. The model name and the threshold λ thus identify
the instance; Ω refers to the oracle type.21 We then list the generalization approach. For
each configuration, we report the number of iterations of PrIC3H and the run time in
seconds.
21 We use 100 value iteration steps for Oracle 3.
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Table 2. Comparison of the number iterations of PrIC3’s outermost loop and its run times (in
seconds) for three different oracles Ω.
λ Ω w/o lin pol hyb
Z
er
oC
on
f
0.75
1 - TO - TO - TO - MO
2 - TO - TO 0 0.3 0 0.1
3 - TO - TO 1 0.2 1 0.2
0.52
1 - TO - TO - TO - MO
2 - TO - TO 0 0.3 0 0.1
3 - TO - TO 1 0.2 1 0.2
0.45
1 - TO - TO - TO - MO
2 1 < 0.1 1 < 0.1 1 < 0.1 1 < 0.1
3 1 < 0.1 1 < 0.1 1 < 0.1 1 < 0.1
C
ha
in
0.9
1 0 20.72 0 65.7 0 0.1 0 0.1
2 0 19.1 0 64.9 0 1.1 0 0.2
3 0 22.3 0 65.7 0 1.1 0 0.2
0.4
1 0 23.4 0 61.9 0 22.1 - MO
2 0 21.2 0 61.9 0 1.0 - MO
3 0 23.4 0 65.1 0 1.0 - MO
0.35
1 1 77.8 1 99.5 - TO - MO
2 1 79.1 1 107.3 - TO - MO
3 1 90.1 1 123.2 - TO - MO
D
ou
bl
e
C
ha
in
0.3
1 - TO - TO - TO 1 9.9
2 - TO - TO 0 302.7 0 0.4
3 0 192.5 0 223.4 0 28.4 0 0.5
0.216
1 - TO - TO - TO - MO
2 - TO - TO 0 245.5 - MO
3 - TO - TO - TO - MO
0.15
1 - TO - TO - TO - MO
2 25 373.5 18 701.3 - TO - MO
3 - TO - TO - TO - MO
